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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to offer a broad profile of firms with publicly supported R&D 
projects, which allows us to explain their different degrees of additionality. With this 
objective, in a first step we use standard Propensity Score Matching techniques to estimate 
treatment effects at the firm level, and then we explore the determinants of the heterogeneity 
in these individual effects through the estimation of an equation for their determinants. For 
our analysis, we use information from a sample of 8,168 Spanish firms for the period 2007-
2014. We report three main results. First, firms with multiple program participation show 
higher additionality. However, individual treatment effects, which are positive for firms with 
low support intensities, go sharply below the average for firms with very high support 
intensities. Second, the degree of additionality is positively related to firm characteristics 
denoting a more innovative nature, while it is negatively associated with features present in 
firms involved in more market-oriented R&D projects. Third, firm size has a positive relation 
to the probability of full additionality, but a negative association with the degree of 
additionality in terms of net R&D intensity. These results can provide public agencies with 
some tools for adjusting their selection procedures. 
Keywords: R&D support; policy evaluation; heterogeneous treatment effects; propensity score 
matching. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A large number of evaluation studies regarding public support to business R&D and 
innovation focus on the existence of financial or input additionality, that is, the increase in 
business expenditure on R&D (BERD) caused by the support. With this objective, and having 
in mind the potential endogeneity of subsidies, most recent studies use Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) methods, which allow matching each subsidized firm with a similar non-
supported one and computing the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) as the 
average difference between the BERD of supported firms and the BERD of the control group 
of similar non-supported companies (Correa et al., 2013).  
 
However, only a few studies investigate the existence or the determinants of the 
heterogeneous effects of public support among backed firms. In these cases, the usual 
methodology consists of estimating the average treatment effect by different subsamples of 
firms defined in terms of one specific dimension (size, sector, etc.) considered as the source of 
the heterogeneity in estimated impacts. In addition, sometimes these analyses provide 
contradictory results about the role of the dimension chosen. To our knowledge, there is no 
study that takes simultaneously into account a wide set of dimensions of the firms or the 
support programs so that it allows characterizing the profile of supported firms. In fact, this is 
one of the main shortcomings of the existing studies pointed out in the review by 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014). 
 
Therefore, the main objective and novelty of this paper is to offer a broad profile of publicly 
supported firms with different degrees of additionality, simultaneously considering variables 
that reflect structural characteristics of the firms, their innovative behavior and features of the 
support schemes. An additional objective of our study is to shed some light on the 
contradictions in previous literature on this subject.  
 
For this purpose, in a first step we use standard PSM techniques to estimate the effect of the 
public program in terms of the ATET on the gross or net (of subsidies) R&D intensity. In a 
second step, we focus on the heterogeneity of estimated individual effects among the firms, 
and we investigate this heterogeneity by estimating an equation of the determinants of 
individual treatment effects on net R&D intensities. 
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For our analysis, we use information from the Spanish Panel of Technological Innovation for 
the period 2007-2014. Our sample consists of 36,497 observations which correspond to 8,168 
Spanish firms, 41% of which received subsidies from regional, national and/or European 
public agencies during the period.  
 
Spanish firms provide a good testing case for our research. Since the beginning of the 
economic crisis, the evolution of the Spanish innovation system has shown a negative 
trend, with reductions in the percentages of gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) and the 
BERD over gross domestic product (GDP).1 Moreover, Spain has exhibited a drastic 
reduction in the number (and percentage) of firms that introduced product or process 
innovations (from 16,443 (37%) in 2002 to 6,852 (24%) in 2016). According to the data 
from Eurostat, these trends diverge from those of the largest European countries, which in 
some cases even increased their GERD to overcome the crisis. Therefore, the evaluation of 
innovation policies for Spanish firms in this context is important.  
 
We report three main results. First, we find that firms that receive support from multiple 
levels of the public administration show higher levels of impact. However, at the same time, 
individual treatment effects, which are positive for firms with low support intensities, go 
sharply below the average for firms with very high support intensities. Second, we show that 
the degree of additionality is positively related to firm characteristics denoting a more 
innovative nature, while it is negatively associated with features present in firms with more 
market-oriented R&D projects and that operate in more competitive environments. Third, 
effect of firm size on the probability of full additionality is different from its effect on the 
magnitude of treatment effects on net R&D intensity. These results can provide support 
agencies with some tools for adjusting their selection procedures. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on the 
heterogeneous effects of public support to business R&D. Section 3 presents the methodology 
and the database used for our analysis. In this section, we also offer a discussion on the 
additionality concept used in this paper. In Section 4, we summarize the main results in terms 
of ATETs and elaborate the profile of backed firms with different individual treatment effects. 
In the last section, we offer some final remarks and conclusions. 
                                                          
1
 GERD (BERD) as a percentage of GDP decreased from 1.35% in 2009 to 1.2% in 2017 (from 0.55% to 
0.52%). 
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2. Empirical evidence on heterogeneous impacts 
 
The theoretical conceptualization of the term additionality can be expressed in a very simple 
way: "something that is obtained thanks to public intervention, which would not exist without 
it and which basically responds to the incentive effect of public policy" (Georghiou, 1994). In 
the case of evaluation studies, additionality would imply the existence of an empirically 
observed effect that is undoubtedly caused by the existence of the support and that is not 
attributable to other explanatory factors (attributable causality). In economic terms, it implies 
the Marshallian notion of "ceteris paribus" by isolating the economic effect of the support, 
assuming that all other (micro and macro) economic parameters remain constant.  
 
The essential methodological problem for the evaluation of public support for innovation is 
the existence of the so-called selection bias, a problem defined by Heckman (1979). This bias 
occurs because, in the case of public aid to business R&D or innovation, companies with and 
without the aid are, by definition, different from each other. A generally accepted solution 
applied to overcome the selection bias in the case of evaluation studies is the use of matching 
methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
Although the use of matching methods for impact evaluation of innovation subsidies is quite 
common, previous empirical evaluations with these procedures offer heterogeneous results, 
especially when the studies allow for differentiated impacts by type of firm or support 
program. According to Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014), “this heterogeneity cannot be explained 
fully by methodological issues. The theoretical framework of analysis, the population under 
study and the sources and characteristics of the subsidy programs may determine the 
existence of additionality or crowding-out effect”.  
 
For instance, regarding the heterogeneity in estimated impacts by firm size, some studies offer 
evidence of a higher impact of public support in large firms (González and Pazó, 2008; 
Marino et al., 2015; Crespi et al., 2016), while others reach the opposite conclusion (Herrera 
and Bravo, 2010; Cerulli and Potì, 2012; Huergo and Moreno, 2017; Starlacchini and 
Venturini, 2018). González and Pazó (2008) suggest that this contradiction could be explained 
by the composition of the control group. If non-innovative firms were also included in the 
control group, larger firms would show a higher effect, while the relation would be the 
opposite when only firms with R&D activities are considered. Moreover, Czarnitzki and 
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Hussinger (2004) show that the effect in the sub-sample of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is lower when the magnitude of R&D expenditure is used as a dependent 
variable, while it is higher when the dependent variable is the intensity of BERD.  
 
Since the effect of public subsidies might vary among sectors with different technological 
levels, especially between high-tech and low-tech industries, Cerulli and Potì (2012), Dai and 
Cheng (2015), Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) and Afcha and García-Quevedo (2016) 
estimate the effect of the aid by repeating the PSM procedure by subsamples defined 
according to the technological level of the sector where the company operates. These studies 
find, in general, higher impacts in more R&D-intensive sectors. The exception is Cerulli and 
Potì (2012), whose results show a higher effect for medium-low technology sectors. 
 
Another aspect analyzed by several studies to explain the heterogeneity in the impacts of 
public aid is the specific type/design of the support program. In this line, Carboni (2011), 
Marino et al. (2015) and Hottenrott et al. (2017) find that firms that receive public aid from 
multiple instruments or levels of administration experience greater impacts, while Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) estimate a higher effect for firms that receive European funds than 
for firms awarded national funds. Moreover, in some cases, the existence of crowding-out 
effects between different instruments of support cannot be rejected (Huergo and Moreno, 
2017). Aschhoff (2009) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) also find that firms that 
frequently participate in public support programs show a higher level of financial 
additionality.  
 
Regarding the subsidy intensity (amount of support as a percentage of R&D expenditures), 
Görg and Strobl (2007) and Marino et al. (2015) obtain a higher level of impact for firms with 
a high subsidy intensity. Nevertheless, Dai and Cheng (2015) show a non-linear effect; 
namely, there is a saturation point beyond which a further increase in public subsidies does 
not yield an increase of a firm's total R&D investment. 
 
In order to control for the overall context of the support program, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) 
and Cerulli and Potì (2012) analyze the dissimilar effect for different types of regions within 
the country. They find a higher level of impact for the firms of poorer and less innovative 
regions located in eastern Germany and southern Italy. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013), 
Hud and Hussinger (2015) and Hottenrott et al. (2017) evaluate the heterogeneity of the 
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impact for the economic up and down swing (crisis) periods. The first two studies obtain a 
stronger effect in the crisis period, while the last one does not find any significant difference 
in the period before versus during the crisis. 
 
As can be observed, most of the studies cited consider only one to three dimensions to explain 
the heterogeneity of impacts. With the exception of firm size, for most of these dimensions, 
there is evidence in only a few papers and the results are not always homogeneous. This is 
maybe because of a lack of standardization in the choice of the dependent variable and the set 
of independent covariates for the matching process. The exact specification of empirical 
models is sometimes a discretionary decision, and often depends on data availability (see the 
discussion in Section 3). These facts and the small number of studies that analyze each 
dimension make it difficult to detect patterns that explain contradictory results. 
 
From a methodological point of view, the alternative used in most studies to capture 
heterogeneous effects is the estimation of average treatment effects by different subsamples of 
firms that are defined in terms of the heterogeneity factor to be considered (large firms vs 
SMEs, firms with low support intensity vs firms with high intensity, etc.). This procedure 
prevents us from taking into account the interaction of the selected factor with other 
dimensions.  
 
Two exceptions are the studies by Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) and Hottenrott et al. 
(2017), who focus on the determinants of individual treatment effects (ITEs).2 Czarnitzki and 
Delanote (2015) estimate a regression model using the ITEs (in absolute value) as a 
dependent variable to examine the difference in the intensity of the impact between new 
technology-based firms (NTBF) and other firms. They simultaneously include a large number 
of explanatory variables, though they use them only as pure control variables and do not offer 
a broad characterization of the heterogeneous impact level of the subsidies. Hottenrott et al. 
(2017) use estimated ITEs to analyze the different effects of public support between the crisis 
and up-swing period. 
 
In summary, the studies reviewed here find, in general, substantial differences in the impacts 
of public aid by subsamples of firms, and therefore conclude that the response to the 
                                                          
2
 Chapman et al. (2018) also use a similar methodology, but they analyze the impact of R&D subsidies on 
external collaborative breadth.  
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economic stimulus of the subsidy is heterogeneous depending on the firms’ characteristics 
used to define the subsamples. Instead of addressing this issue using subsamples, which 
implies focusing on a specific dimension of the firm or the support program, our research tries 
to offer a broad characterization of the profile of firms with different impact levels of public 
subsidies. To do so, we simultaneously include all the relevant characteristics as explanatory 
variables of estimated ITEs. With this methodology, we expect to explain at least in part some 
of the contradictory results found in previous literature. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
In order to estimate the effect of public subsidies on business R&D private effort, we carry 
out an analysis with two different parts. In the first one, we obtain ATETs and test the 
presence of additionality or crowding out effects. In the second one, we focus on the 
heterogeneity of estimated individual effects among the firms.  
 
3.1. Treatment effects estimation and types of additionality  
 
The aim of this part of the analysis is the estimation of the effect of public subsidies on the 
R&D input of supported firms. As we have mentioned before, to obtain the subsidy effect, we 
use standard PSM techniques. Under certain conditions, this procedure allows us to compute 
the effect of the public program or treatment in terms of the difference in the outcomes 
between subsidized or treated firms and a ‘comparable’ control group of non-subsidized 
firms.  
 
Consider that each firm can have two states that we represent by 1T   if the firm has been 
subsidized, and by 0T   otherwise. The treatment effect on firm i  can be written as: 
1 0i i iY Y   ,      (1) 
where 1iY  denotes the treatment outcome if the firm obtained the subsidy and 0iY  if the firm 
was not subsidized. In order to evaluate the impact of public subsidies on subsidized firms, 
most studies are interested in the estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET): 
     1 0 1 0| 1 | 1 | 1      ATET E Y Y T E Y T E Y T    (2) 
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The fundamental evaluation problem arises because we can only observe one of the potential 
treatment outcomes for each individual i  (Holland, 1986). If subsidies were assigned 
randomly, this issue could be addressed by comparing the outcomes of treated and untreated 
firms. However, the main drawback of the estimation is that the selection of supported firms 
is not usually random, which could lead to a presence of the selection bias (Heckman, 1979), 
because supported firms are different from non-subsidized ones. Therefore, we need to 
estimate the counterfactual, that is, to construct a control sample of firms with characteristics 
similar to those of the treated group. Given the difficulty of finding firms with the same 
characteristics, one alternative is the use of the PSM. Through this non-parametric approach, 
we condensate the information of all characteristics (X) in only one, the estimated likelihood 
of program participation conditioned on X (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
 
This methodology is based on the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which 
indicates that, given a set of observable covariates (X) which are not affected by the treatment, 
potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment (Rubin, 1977): 
1 0( , ) |i iY Y T X      (3) 
 
If the CIA holds, the estimated treatment effect at the firm level, iˆ , can be obtained by 
substituting the non-observed 0iY  for the treatment outcome of a firm with a similar 
propensity score (matched firm), but without the subsidy, 0ˆiY : 
1 0ˆˆ  i i iY Y                                                              (4) 
 
Consequently, we can compute the ATET as the mean of estimated individual treatment 
effects: 
1
1ˆ ˆ N iiATET N       (5) 
 
In our analysis, we use equation [4] to estimate the treatment effect for each firm using two 
different measures of R&D input as treatment outcomes: gross and net R&D expenditures. 
The latter correspond to R&D expenditures funded with own resources, while gross R&D 
expenditures also include the quantity of public subsidies. In other words, in the case of net 
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expenditures, public aid is excluded for the estimation of the treatment effect. The use of each 
option implies important differences in terms of the interpretation of the results.  
 
When we use net BERD as a treatment outcome, a positive ˆ neti implies that the firm used at 
least all the support obtained to increase its initially foreseen BERD, adding extra private 
funds. A negative ˆ neti refers to a firm with a partial additionality effect or with a total 
crowding out effect. In the estimations based on gross BERD, a positiveˆ grossi  reveals that, at 
least, a partial additionality effect exists. However, in this case it is not clear whether the 
increase of the BERD is equal to or less than the amount of the public support. 
 
Using the combination of results about treatment effects, we can define three excluding types 
of additionality effects (see Table 1): (1) Full additionality (FADD) ˆ ˆ( 0 and 0)  net grossi i : 
The support scheme encourages the firm to increase its initially foreseen BERD level with an 
amount greater than the public funds obtained; (2) Partial substitution (PSUB)
ˆ ˆ( 0 and 0)  net grossi i : The company increases its R&D expenditures initially envisaged, but 
with an amount lower than the grants obtained. (3) Full crowding out or substitution 
(FSUB) ˆ ˆ( 0 and 0)  net grossi i : In this case, the companies replace the initially foreseen 
investment of private funds with the public funds obtained and keep their R&D spending at 
(or below) the pre-aid level. In these circumstances, there is no financial additionality at all, a 
situation known in the literature as full "crowding out" or free riding effect.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3.2. Analysis of the heterogeneity of individual treatment effects 
 
Since differences in the characteristics of the firms like their absorptive capacity, path 
dependency or technological opportunity could lead to different treatment effects on the 
individual R&D effort, to analyze the determinants of this heterogeneity in a second step, we 
carry out two different estimations based on estimated treatment effects at the firm level. The 
first is oriented to study the determinants of the likelihood of showing total additionality, that 
is, Pr( 1| )i iZ  . Therefore, we estimate a Probit model where the dependent variable takes 
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the value one if the firm has positive estimated treatment effects on both gross and net 
expenditures, and zero otherwise: 
ˆ ˆ1 if >0 and >0
0 otherwise
gross net
i i
i
                         (7) 
 
Secondly, to explore the determinants of the heterogeneity in the magnitude of the effects 
rather than on the probability of showing additionality, following Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014), Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) and Chapman et al. (2018), we estimate an equation 
that considers the estimated individual treatment effect a dependent variable:3 
0ˆ     neti j iZ                                                             (8) 
 
One contribution of our analysis is that, to compute ˆ i , we consider both absolute and relative 
measures of R&D expenditures in our estimates. To classify supported firms by type of 
additionality as defined in Table 1, ˆ ˆ
 and  net grossi i are obtained by using the absolute amount of 
net and gross R&D expenditures, respectively. However, to compute ATETs and to study the 
determinants of individual treatment effects, ˆ ˆ
 and  net grossi i are expressed in terms of the R&D 
intensity, that is, the percentage of (net or gross) R&D expenditures over sales.  
 
The advantage of using R&D intensities to analyze the heterogeneity in treatment effects is 
that they reflect the impacts relative to the firm size. The magnitude of subsidized projects 
usually depends on the activity sector in which the firm operates and also varies with firm 
size. When using the level of net R&D expenditures for computing ATETs, the volume of 
R&D expenditures of large firms dominates ATETs to the detriment of smaller firms. This 
dominance disappears when R&D expenditures are introduced in percentages over sales. 
Moreover, the use of the R&D intensity as an outcome indicator can also be interpreted as a 
sign of behavioral additionality in terms of the firms’ innovative culture. 
 
Notice that measuring financial additionality through the effects on R&D intensities implies a 
more demanding definition of additionality than the traditional concept in the literature 
                                                          
3
 Since the effect of individual treatment comes from an estimate, the effect of the error in the previous 
estimation should be controlled for. To avoid the influence of outliers, we opt for bootstrapping standard errors 
in our estimations, like Beck et al. (2016). 
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(Buisseret et al., 1995). In this sense, a positive effect of public support on R&D intensity is 
consistent not only with increases in BERD, but also with decreases in sales or with higher 
growth rates of BERD than those of sales. 
 
3.3.Data and variables 
 
The dataset used in our analysis consists of firm-level panel data from the Spanish Innovation 
Survey, which uses the so-called ‘Panel of Technological Innovation’ (PITEC). This survey is 
conducted by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the Spanish Science and 
Technology Foundation (FECYT). The database was initiated in the year 2003, but this study 
is focused on the period 2007-2014 because information about the amount of public subsidies 
is not available for the whole period. The structure of the data allows us to use lags of the 
variables to alleviate the endogeneity problem. 
 
Despite the fact that the sample contains information for both innovative and non-innovative 
firms, we restrict our analysis to the innovative firms; this guarantees better matches since we 
compare firms with similar structures of R&D expenditures. After cleaning the data of firms 
with missing information for the relevant variables, our sample consists of 36,497 
observations which correspond to 8168 different firms, 41% of which have received 
“selective” subsidies from regional, national and/or European public agencies, with an 
average support intensity (amount of subsidies over total BERD) of 8.7%.4 
 
Regarding national support, between the years 2007 and 2014, three national plans of R&D&I 
were implemented, for the periods 2004-2007, 2008-2011 and 2013-2016, respectively. In all 
the plans, the financing of business R&D projects was subject to an ex-ante evaluation for the 
selection of the proposals. In the case of technological innovation projects, the Center for the 
Development of Industrial Technology channeled most of the direct R&D support. As for 
European aid, during the same period, Spanish firms got financing mainly through the 7th 
Framework Programme (FP) of the EU (2007-2013). In this FP, the selection of proposals 
followed criteria of excellence and most awarded projects were complex and science-oriented. 
                                                          
4
 Following Colombo et al. (2011), we consider a subsidy “selective” if it is a public subsidy awarded through a 
competitive procedure that requires ex-ante evaluation of the firm’s R&D project by the public agency.  
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In addition, to encourage inter-European cooperation, the conditions for being awarded 
involved the participation of partners from several countries.5 
 
For the estimation of the propensity score, we construct a binary variable, which takes the 
value one if the firm has received public subsidies from at least one of the three different 
administrative levels –regional, national or European– and zero otherwise.  
 
As we have mentioned, our outcome indicators are based on firms’ gross or net R&D 
expenditures, whether expressed in levels or as percentages of total sales. As expected, the 
statistics in Table 2 show that the sample averages of gross or net R&D intensities are higher 
in the case of awarded firms. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Following related literature and considering our theoretical framework, we select a broad 
variety of control variables that could have an influence in the firm’s participation status. The 
set of explanatory variables includes characteristics of ownership structure of the firms, their 
innovative behavior and their perceptions about the difficulties of carrying out innovative 
activities.  
 
The size of the firms in terms of the number of employees (in logs.) has been included as a 
control variable since it is considered that larger firms participate more frequently in the 
subsidies, because the development of innovations may involve fixed set-up costs, and 
expected revenues generated by the innovations will be a function of the price and size of 
demand. In this sense, larger firms could more easily overcome the fixed cost barrier and have 
market power (Blanes and Busom, 2004). In fact, as we can see in Table 2, the average size of 
supported firms is slightly larger than the size of non-participants in public programs. In the 
estimates, we also include the square of the size in order to allow for a non-linear relationship. 
 
The logarithm of the firm’s age (number of years since creation) is included to capture 
learning effects associated with the time that the firms have been in the market. For instance, 
                                                          
5
 Unfortunately, we cannot control for the effect of other policy instruments like R&D tax credits or soft loans, 
because we do not have access to information related to the use of these instruments in our database. We share 
this limitation with most empirical studies about the Spanish Innovation System. Two exceptions are Huergo and 
Moreno (2017) and Busom et al. (2017). 
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older firms could have more experience in dealing with public support agencies, although in 
our sample, supported firms are, on average, younger than non-supported ones. 
 
Exporting companies tend to present a greater capacity to transform research into product 
innovations (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006), as international markets are usually more 
competitive than the local ones; firms with a presence in foreign markets could participate in 
the programs more frequently if public agencies attempt to improve the competitiveness of 
their firms. Therefore, to take into account this possibility, we define a binary variable that 
takes the value one if the firm is an exporter. As we can see in Table 2, the percentage of 
exporters among awarded firms is 66.7, while this percentage is lower (64.7%) in the case of 
untreated firms. 
 
There can be considerable differences in the incentives to apply for public funding depending 
on a firm’s property structure. Affiliates of foreign-owned companies might be discriminated 
against in the participation of the subsidies because regional agencies would prefer to support 
local firms. In the case of multinational enterprises, if European agencies support the parent 
company, the affiliates might not have incentives to apply for more aid. On the other hand, 
firms with public property might be more inclined to apply for the funding because of their 
relationship with the administration and their knowledge of the bureaucratic process. In our 
sample, the percentage of firms with participation of public capital is higher among supported 
firms, while the percentage of firms with a presence of foreign capital is greater among non-
supported ones. Also, in the case of awarded firms, we find a higher proportion of firms that 
belong to a domestic group. 
 
Related to innovative behavior, we consider several variables that reflect the capabilities of 
the firms. First, to reflect previous experience in successful innovation activities, we use the 
number of patent applications (in logs.), since it might have an important role if the agencies 
adopt a picking-the-winner strategy. Second, to capture the influence of firms’ absorption 
capacity, we include a dummy variable for technological cooperation and a measure of 
human capital in terms of the ratio of the number of workers with higher education over the 
total number of employees. Researchers are considered more productive when they can 
exchange knowledge (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). In addition, if the aim of public agencies 
is to repair market failures associated with the lack of whole appropriability of profits and 
uncertainty, firms that undertake basic research should be preferred (Nelson, 1959). In order 
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to capture this effect, three binary variables have been included. These variables take the 
value one if, respectively, the firms have designated funds to basic research, applied research 
or technological development. 
 
Finally, we take into account the importance of certain obstacles to innovation, since such 
barriers could be determinants of applying for or being awarded public aid. We are especially 
interested in analyzing the role of financial factors, as firms with financial restrictions are 
more prone to using public support to amplify their R&D expenditures. On the one hand, one 
of the most frequent objectives of public agencies is to support firms that have good ideas but 
suffer from financial constraints. On the other hand, it might be interesting to analyze whether 
firms with more financial restrictions show a higher impact level.  
 
Additionally, recent empirical literature finds that not only financial obstacles act as deterrent 
barriers to engaging in innovation activities or translating these activities into new products or 
processes. For instance, García-Quevedo et al. (2017) find that a lack of demand for 
innovation has a negative impact on both the likelihood of engaging in R&D activities and the 
amount of investment in R&D of Spanish firms. Also, Pellegrino and Savona (2017) obtain 
that market-related obstacles (concentrated market structure and lack of demand) are 
important financial constraints in determining innovation failures of UK firms. For this 
reason, we also consider knowledge and market factors as potential determinants in equation 
[8].6 
 
In our database, the companies declare how important some factors are as elements that 
hamper their innovation in a three-year period (during the current and last two years). For 
each of the factors, a firm can answer that the importance of the factor is high, intermediate, 
low or not relevant. With this information, we construct three dummy variables to reflect the 
relevance of financial, knowledge and market factors, respectively. Each dummy variable 
takes the value one when companies reported that the importance of at least one factor in the 
category was high and 0 otherwise. 
 
Furthermore, time and sectoral dummies have been included in order to capture the influence 
of differences between companies that belong to different sectors, at the level of both 
                                                          
6
 See a more detailed explanation of the specific financial, knowledge and market-related obstacles considered in 
our analysis in Appendix A. 
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technology sources and the appropriation of knowledge. The sectoral dummies have been 
defined on the basis of an extended, updated version (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2016) of the 
well-known taxonomy of Keith Pavitt (1984), since this classification takes into account both 
the activities of the sector and the technology level. Apart from overcoming market failures, 
public agencies may prefer to finance R&D projects with higher spillover potential (Busom, 
2000). If this is the case, we expect public programs will prefer companies that belong to 
services or high technology sectors, while companies that belong to industrial and non-
technological sectors will probably benefit less frequently from public aid. 
 
We use the same set of explanatory variables as the vector of potential determinants (Z) in 
equations [7] and [8]. The main economic rationale for public intervention is that, because of 
market failures, the level of privately financed R&D activities will be lower than the socially 
desired level (Arrow, 1962).  If the goal of public agencies is to stimulate firms’ private 
effort, they might select those firms with a higher probability of spending more of their own 
resources on R&D. Therefore, the variables that influence public awarding would be the same 
as the ones that influence the magnitude of the effect of public support. 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. Estimation of average and individual treatment effects. 
In this section, we summarize the results of the PSM model used to estimate average and 
individual treatment effects. In Table A.1 of Appendix B, we present the results of the Probit 
model used to compute the propensity score. The quality of the matching procedure can be 
considered satisfying. The averages of explanatory variables in the Probit model converge 
after the matching process, and the analysis shows an almost perfect equality of the 
distribution of the propensity score between supported and non-supported firms (for details, 
see Appendix B). 
 
ATETs in Table 3 correspond to the application of the PSM procedure, using gross and net 
R&D intensities as outcome variables, respectively. We compute these effects through three 
estimators that address different issues related to the composition of the control group. Firstly, 
we implement the matching procedure with replacement so that a control firm can be used 
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more than once. In order to avoid bad matches, we impose the common support condition and 
a maximum distance of 0.0015 between the propensity score of the treated firms and their 
control ones.7 In the second matching procedure, to avoid the influence of a firm used several 
times as control, we use five neighbors to build counterfactual outcomes. Finally, we estimate 
the counterfactual outcomes using Kernel matching, which uses the weighted averages of 
observations from all individuals in the control group.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Regardless of the method used for the matching procedure, estimated ATETs in Table 3 
suggest that supported firms spend on average around 16% more on R&D than firms without 
public aid do, while the difference in net R&D intensity between supported and non-
supported firms is around 5%. As mentioned before, the difference between both levels of 
ATEs depends basically on the amount of support obtained by the firms. In Figure 1, we show 
the kernel density estimation of ITEs on gross and net R&D intensities.8 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
4.2. Profile of firms’ additionality in Spain  
 
To characterize the profile of firms’ additionality in Spain, in this section we use two 
complementary methodologies. First, we use estimated ITEs on the absolute magnitudes of 
net and gross R&D expenditures to classify supported firms by type of additionality as 
defined in Table 1. With this classification, we also perform a descriptive analysis that allows 
us to get an image of the distribution of supported firms not only by type of additionality but 
also in terms of the set of firm characteristics that might be associated with the heterogeneity 
in estimated ITEs. As we can see in Table 4, in our sample, 60.4% of supported firms show 
full additionality (FADD), while we obtain a full crowding out effect (FSUB) for 31.9% of 
the firms. The remaining 7.8% of the firms show a partial substitution effect (PSUB). 
 
                                                          
7
 Adopting these constraints involves dropping 479 observations (4.5%) from the treated group. However, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that there are no significant differences between the distributions of the PS 
after the exclusion of the observations (see Figure B.1 of Appendix B). 
8
 To facilitate image clarity, density functions are represented between percentiles 5 and 95. 
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Second, as we explained in Section 3, we estimate equations [7] and [8] using Probit and 
regression models, respectively (see Table 5).9 The advantage of these estimations is that it 
allows us to simultaneously take into account the interaction of several potential determinants 
in the model. In column (1) of Table 5, ˆ i corresponds to the impact on BERD, while in 
columns (2) and (3), it refers to the individual treatment effect on net R&D intensity.  
 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
The first variables that we consider as potential determinants of heterogeneity in estimated 
ITEs are a set of dummy variables that represent the different levels of governance of public 
agencies supporting R&D projects of Spanish firms. In the last decade, there has been a broad 
discussion about the effect of innovation policies that imply a multi-level approach 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Marino et al., 2015; Huergo and Moreno, 2017). The 
implicit question is whether firms that obtain support from more than one administrative level 
are more prone to following a free rider attitude. In our sample, firms receive subsidies from 
three administrative levels: regional, national and European. For supported firms, we define 
seven excluding dummy variables to represent each of the possible combinations of support: 
only regional, only national, only European, regional and national, regional and European, 
national and European, and all types.  
 
In Table 5, the excluded dummy corresponds to firms with regional and national support that, 
therefore, is the reference category for interpreting marginal effects. Those firms that got 
support from only one administrative level show a lower probability of FADD than firms with 
regional and national support, a fact confirmed by the descriptive data in Table 4. Within 
firms supported through a unique level of governance, the magnitude of the effect is higher 
for the EU-supported firms than for the other two groups. Moreover, the effect of being 
awarded European aid on ITEs is not statistically different from the effect of being awarded 
regional and national support, while the highest impacts correspond to firms that 
simultaneously received EU and regional aid, especially those which benefitted from support 
from the three administrative levels. 
                                                          
9We performed the same estimates for the probability of full or partial additionality ˆPr( 0) grossi and for gross 
ITEs ( ˆ grossi ). See Table C.1 in Appendix C. In terms of the validity of the models, it can be highlighted that 
estimated Probit models correctly classify around 72% of the observations in the case of full additionality, while 
the percentage is around 74% in the case of positive gross ITEs. Also, in the case of regression models, the 
adjustment is better in the case of net ITEs than for gross ITEs. 
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Notice that these results are obtained after controlling for other variables and, in particular, 
the intensity of the subsidy.10 In addition, the effects keep their sign and significance 
regardless of whether ITEs are expressed in levels or in relative (to sales) terms. Taking those 
facts into account, the evidence presented here confirms that firms that receive support from 
multiple levels of the public administration show, in general, higher levels of impact 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Marino et al., 2015; Huergo and Moreno, 2017; 
Hottenrott et al., 2017). Moreover, our results also suggest that firms with support from the 
EU in general show the biggest effects.11 
 
In the case of support intensity (the amount of support as a percentage of total BERD), the 
results of our models in Table 5 reflect a negative and non-linear relationship with both the 
probability of FADD and the ITEs on net R&D intensity. To delve deeper into this relation, in 
Figure 2 we show the ATETs on net R&D intensity by cohorts of the subsidy intensity. In 
order to build the figure, all supported firms are ranked from the lowest (but positive) to the 
highest level of support intensity and classified in 20 cohorts of 5% of the firms. In the figure, 
we can see that ATETs are positive for firms with low support intensities (first eight cohorts) 
and go sharply below the average for firms with very high support intensities (last five 
cohorts).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
This result is partially consistent with the inverted-U correlation between public subsidies and 
private R&D that Dai and Cheng (2015) find for Chinese manufacturing firms through the 
estimation of a dose response function. 
 
Following the literature review in Section 2, the next variable that we consider as a potential 
determinant of heterogeneity in estimated ITEs is the firm size. In Table 4, we can observe 
that the higher the size stratum, the smaller the percentage of firms with a full crowding-out 
effect is. It seems that micro and small firms (with fewer than 50 employees) use public funds 
                                                          
10
 For example, firms that participate in EU programs in general have a larger size, and firms that receive support 
from the three administrative levels have a higher support intensity.  
11
 However, Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2014) do not find differences between the impacts of firms with only 
national versus only European support.  
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less frequently in the intended way.12 In parallel, the profile of firms with full additionality 
effect is clearly characterized by the largest firms (83.2%).  
 
However, firm size shows a negative relationship with treatment effects when these are 
measured in terms of R&D intensities. The results in Table 5 confirm the positive relation of 
firm size with the probability of full additionality (see column (1)), while at the same time 
suggest a negative impact on both the probability of positive ITEs on net R&D intensity and 
the magnitude of these latter ITEs. Additionally, the effect appears to be non-linear, although 
it only turns positive for very large firms (with more than 8,625 employees). This evidence 
allows us to partially reconcile the contradictions observed in previous literature regarding the 
effect of firm size.  
 
In relation to the age of firms, both start-ups and old firms often exhibit total additionality 
(see Table 4). When we include the age (in logs.) as an explanatory variable in the 
specifications of Table 5, the effect is positive in columns (1) and (2), while it is not 
statistically significant in column (3). 
 
As for exporting behavior, the descriptive statistics in Table 4 suggest that full additionality is 
more present among exporters than among non-exporters, regardless of the export intensity of 
exporters. However, this variable does not seem to have any impact on the probability of full 
additionality, probably because the exporter character is more frequent among large firms 
and, therefore, the firm size is indirectly capturing its effect. In fact, the effect of being an 
exporter changes to being negative when ITEs are measured in terms of R&D intensities 
(columns (2) and (3) in Table 5).  
 
Another outstanding element in Table 4 is the ownership structure. About half of independent 
firms show full additionality and around 40% display a total substitution effect. On the 
contrary, the percentage of firms in foreign or domestic groups with full additionality is above 
the average percentage in the total sample. These results are qualified once we control for 
other explanatory variables. Probit models in Table 5 confirm that firms in foreign and 
domestic groups are more likely to present full additionality than independent firms (the 
                                                          
12
 In this paragraph, the percentages refer, respectively, to firms with full additionality versus those with a full 
crowding out effect. Firms that have an above average score in one of these two indicators almost automatically 
have a below average score for the other. Therefore, in the text of this section, we often only mention one of the 
two numbers in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations.  
20 
 
reference group). Nevertheless, while firms that belong to foreign groups also show greater 
effects on net R&D intensity in terms of ITEs, we observe the opposite for companies in 
domestic groups. On the one hand, foreign-owned firms would have advantages over 
independent domestic firms –the group of reference– because they might face typical factors 
that hamper innovation with financial resources and managerial expertise of their enterprise 
group (Dachs and Ebersberg, 2009). On the other hand, geographical and cultural proximity 
may allow enterprises in domestic groups to minimize monitoring costs and overcome agency 
problems, which would lead to lower R&D expenditures. 
 
Looking at the variables that characterize the innovative behavior of firms, we can see that 
companies that applied for patents have a higher probability of full additionality (column (1) 
in Table 5). These firms are expected to have a more innovative culture, which results in a 
positive influence also on the magnitude of ITEs (column (3) in Table 5). Surprisingly, 
regardless of the specification, firms that cooperate in R&D show a lower probability of full 
additionality and minor ITEs on net R&D intensity. Firms whose human capital is better 
educated also seem to have less probability of full additionality, although this variable tends 
to lose statistical significance in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, probably because their 
impact is indirectly captured through the effect of the R&D intensity. In fact, firms with the 
highest gross R&D intensities in the previous year also show the greatest probability of 
FADD and the highest ITEs on net R&D intensity. 
 
As for the type of R&D activities, both percentages in Table 4 and estimated coefficients in 
Table 5 suggest that firms oriented to basic R&D show a higher probability of financial 
additionality and also greater treatment effects on net R&D intensity. The opposite is 
observed regarding firms oriented to applied research or technological development.13 Notice 
that these latter activities are shorter-term and closer to the market, and therefore less affected 
by the inherent uncertainty of the technical and commercial success of the resulting 
innovations. This evidence is in line with Clausen (2009) and Neicu (2019). 
 
Companies that attach great importance to obstacles to innovation, regardless of the type 
(related to economic, knowledge or market factors), present FADD in a slightly lower 
proportion than the average (Table 4). However, once we control for other variables, only 
                                                          
13
 The dummies for the type or R&D activities are not excluding. 
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financial obstacles to innovation have a negative impact on the probability of full 
additionality. The results in column (3) of Table 5 also suggest that the relationships among 
explanatory and outcome variables are, again, different when ITEs are estimated on net R&D 
intensity. In this case, none of the three types of obstacles to innovation appears to affect the 
magnitude of the ITEs in our sample. This absence of effect might also be associated with the 
positive correlation between the three indicators of perceived obstacles among supported 
firms. 
 
In terms of the activity sector, previous empirical evidence just focuses on the differential 
impact for firms in R&D-intensive sectors compared with firms in other sectors. Our results 
suggest that the impact of the type of activity carried out by the firm is different depending on 
whether we choose absolute or relative measures for ITEs. Specifically, as expected, firms in 
scale-intensive, science-based and high-tech services sectors show a higher probability of 
positive ITEs on net R&D intensities than firms in low-tech services and construction (the 
reference-excluded category). However, no significant difference is found relative to 
companies in traditional sectors (producers of traditional consumer goods and suppliers of 
basic or traditional intermediate goods) or in sectors of specialized suppliers. Firms in scale-
intensive and especially in high-tech services sectors also present greater effects on estimated 
ITEs.  
 
5.- Conclusions and final remarks 
 
Nowadays, propensity score matching (PSM) is accepted as a standardized procedure for 
evaluating the impact of public support to private R&D and innovation. Using this 
methodology, the main research question in most existing studies is whether public R&D 
spending complements or displaces private R&D spending. In the absence of information 
about the amount of subsidies awarded, the answer to this question is reinterpreted in terms of 
rejecting the full crowding-out hypothesis or not.  
 
However, only a few studies shed some light on the existence of differential effects of the 
subsidies among supported firms and try to relate these differences to specific firm 
characteristics. Moreover, as we showed in Section 2, these studies focus only on one or a 
very small number of firm dimensions to explain the heterogeneity in estimated impacts. In 
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these cases, the methodological alternative usually consists of estimating average treatment 
effects by different subsamples of firms defined in terms of the heterogeneity factor that is 
considered.  
 
In this context, the main contribution of this paper is the implementation of a broad 
characterization of the profile of firms with publicly supported R&D projects, which allows 
us to explain their different degrees of additionality. This depiction is made in terms of a wide 
set of variables that refer to some structural features of the firms, their innovative behavior, 
their perceived obstacles to innovation and several aspects of the public program.  
 
With this objective, in a first step we use standard PSM techniques to estimate the effect of 
public financial aid in terms of the difference in the outcomes between subsidized or treated 
firms and a ‘comparable’ control group of non-subsidized firms. This also allows us to test the 
presence of additionality or crowding out effects in our sample. In a second step, we focus on 
the heterogeneity of estimated individual effects among the firms. We explore the 
determinants of this heterogeneity through the estimation of an equation for estimated 
individual treatment effects as a dependent variable. 
 
One additional contribution of our analysis is that, to compute individual treatment effects, we 
consider both absolute and relative measures of R&D expenditures in our estimates. To 
identify firms with full additionality, we use the amounts of (gross and net) R&D 
expenditures, while to study the determinants of the heterogeneity in the effects, we consider 
treatment effects on net R&D intensity, which is measured as the percentage of net R&D 
expenditures over sales. Such a way of measuring the “impact” of public support allows an 
expression of estimated effects relative to firm size. 
 
The results obtained for a sample of Spanish firms during the period 2007-2014 can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
First, regarding the features of support programs, the lowest impacts correspond to firms that 
are awarded aid by only one administrative level. On the contrary, firms that obtain support 
from regional, national and European levels show the highest impacts. The support intensity 
shows a non-linear relationship with the impact level. Financial additionality is positive for 
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firms with low support intensity and goes sharply below the average for firms with very high 
support intensity. 
Second, we find a higher level of impact –in terms of the probability of showing full 
additionality and the magnitude of treatment effects– in firms operating in scale-intensive 
sectors, oriented to basic R&D and with more applications for patents, higher R&D intensity 
or a majority presence of foreign capital. Notice that these features often coincide in firms that 
generate the most radical innovations. In contrast, firms in export markets, which establish 
technological cooperation agreements and which have positive expenditures on applied 
research or technological development, show lower additionality levels of public support. 
These latter dimensions are usually present in firms involved in more market-oriented R&D 
projects, probably because they are subject to greater competitive pressures. Obviously, these 
relationships can be conditioned by the complementarity or substitutability among the effects 
of some of the explanatory variables. 
 
Third, firm size has a different effect on the probability of full additionality than it does on the 
magnitude of the treatment effect on net R&D intensity. In particular, SMEs appear to have a 
lower probability of full additionality. However, at the same time, they show higher treatment 
effects on net R&D intensity. This evidence allows us to partially reconcile the contradictions 
observed in previous literature regarding the effect of firm size. During the period of analysis, 
which corresponds to the economic crisis, most SMEs show a negative evolution in their 
sales. Therefore, even a partial additionality of public support implies a growth in the rate of 
net R&D expenditures that would result in an increase in R&D intensity.  
 
The profile revealed by our analysis provides support agencies with some suggestions for 
adjusting their programs or selection procedures for some specific cases. For instance, while 
foreign firms seem to be discriminated during the selection procedure, participating less 
frequently in public programs14, at the same time they show higher additionality effects, so 
the agencies should reconsider the discrimination. Something similar happens with basic 
research. Firms with positive expenditures on basic research show a lower participation 
propensity in public programs than those with expenditures on applied research or technical 
development. However, our results suggest higher impact levels for such firms. 
 
                                                          
14
 See Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
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Regarding the design of support programs, although we have seen that the highest intensities 
of additionality correspond to the most innovative firms, this does not imply not supporting 
less innovative companies. On the one hand, we have analyzed the heterogeneity in treatment 
effects of supported firms that, by definition, are R&D performers. On the other hand, public 
support can also affect the probability of undertaking R&D activities (extensive margin). In 
addition, the policy mix may develop additional tools to incentivize R&D and innovation 
activities in firms with a less innovative culture.  
 
Based on the results of this paper, three future research questions can be mentioned. Firstly, it 
would be interesting to analyze the underlying reasons for the higher impact of European 
support. On one side, it could be related to the more-basic type of R&D that is financed 
through the European Union Framework Programme. On the other, it could be explained by a 
not “picking-the-winners” selection strategy in national or regional support programs. In the 
case of Spain, it is often argued that public support for R&D is used as an economic 
convergence policy for firms in lagging regions (Heijs, 2012). Secondly, the implications of 
the higher level of impact in the case of firms with foreign capital justify a more detailed 
analysis of the role of foreign groups in national innovation systems, especially with regard to 
the measure of unintentional spillovers to other firms. And, thirdly, more research is needed 
about the effect of financial constraints on the level of additionality of public aid. For this 
analysis, it would be relevant to have information not only about firm-perceived economic 
obstacles to innovation but also about effective financial constraints. 
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Figure 1.- Densities of estimated individual treatment effects (ITEs) on gross and net 
R&D intensity 
 
 
 
Notes: Kernel density estimations between ITE percentiles 5 and 95. Gross (net) ATET: Average treatment 
effect on gross (net) R&D intensity. 
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Figure 2.- ATETs on net R&D intensity by cohort of subsidy intensity  
 
 
 
Notes: Supported firms are ranked from the lowest (but positive) to the highest level of support intensity and 
classified in 20 cohorts of 5% of the firms. Net ATET: ATET on net R&D intensity.  
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Table 1.- Types of additionality based on the combination of estimated treatment effects 
on net and gross R&D expenditures 
  Treatment effect on net R&D expenditures (ˆ neti ) 
  
ˆ 0 neti  ˆ 0 neti  
Treatment 
effect on 
gross R&D 
expenditures 
(ˆ grossi ) 
ˆ 0 grossi  Full additionality  (FADD) 
Partial substitution* 
 (PSUB) 
ˆ 0 grossi  Impossible 
Full crowding-out or  
substitution  
(FSUB)  
* Or partial additionality effect. 
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Table 2.- Means of main variables by type of public support 
  Supported firms   Non-supported firms   
Difference 
of means 
testa 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Outcome variables        
   Gross R&D intensity 0.313 0.768 
 
0.073 0.334 
 
0.241*** 
   Net R&D intensity 0.197 0.502 
 
0.073 0.334 
 
0.125*** 
Firm characteristics 
       
   Size (in logs.) 4.299 1.643 
 
4.257 1.607 
 
0.042*** 
   Age (in logs.) 3.072 0.66 
 
3.221 0.619 
 
-0.149*** 
   Exporter (Yes/No) 0.667 0.471 
 
0.647 0.478 
 
0.020*** 
   Ownership structure 
       
      - Public capital (Yes/No) 0.034 0.182 
 
0.020 0.142 
 
0.014*** 
      - Foreign capital (Yes/No) 0.084 0.278 
 
0.151 0.358 
 
-0.067*** 
      - Domestic Group (Yes/No) 0.379 0.485   0.315 0.465   0.064*** 
   Patent applications (in logs.)  0.351 0.744 
 
0.145 0.466 
 
0.205*** 
   Technological cooperation (Yes/No) 0.701 0.458 
 
0.348 0.476 
 
0.353*** 
   Human capital (%) 0.418 0.317 
 
0.277 0.268 
 
0.141*** 
   Type of R&D activities:        
   - Basic Research (Yes/No) 0.141 0.348  0.079 0.270  0.062*** 
   - Applied Research (Yes/No) 0.685 0.464  0.461 0.498  0.224*** 
   - Technological Development (Yes/No) 0.801 0.399  0.536 0.499  0.265*** 
   Obstacles to innovation: 
       
      - Financial factors  (Yes/No) 0.592 0.491 
 
0.514 0.500 
 
0.079*** 
      - Knowledge factors  (Yes/No) 0.252 0.434 
 
0.207 0.405 
 
0.045*** 
      - Market factors  (Yes/No) 0.375 0.484 
 
0.339 0.473 
 
0.037*** 
   Activity sector: 
       
      - P. trad. consumer goods  (Yes/No) 0.140 0.347 
 
0.218 0.413 
 
-0.079*** 
      - P. trad. intermediate goods  (Yes/No) 0.069 0.254  0.075 0.263  -0.005* 
      - Specialized suppliers (Yes/No) 0.095 0.294  0.120 0.324  -0.024*** 
      - Scale-intensive (Yes/No) 0.118 0.322  0.109 0.311  0.009*** 
      - Science-based sectors (Yes/No) 0.074 0.262  0.110 0.312  -0.035*** 
      - High-tech services  (Yes/No) 0.228 0.419  0.087 0.283  0.140** 
No. observations 10,575   25,922    
Notes: S.D.: Standard deviation. a: two-sample difference of means test. ***p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05, *p-
value<0.1. 
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Table 3.- Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) 
 
Effect on 
gross R&D Intensity   
Effect on  
net R&D Intensity   
  ATET S.E.   ATET S.E. 
NNM(1) comm cal(0.0015) 0.157*** 0.014 
 
0.049*** 0.011 
NNM(5) comm 0.161*** 0.011 
 
0.050*** 0.011 
Kernel comm 0.160*** 0.008   0.049*** 0.006 
Notes: ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. S.E. = Standard errors have been bootstrapped 
100 times. NNM (n) = Nearest Neighbor Matching with n firms. Comm = Common support. 
Cal(0.0015)=the maximum distance allowed between treated and control firm is 0.0015. 
Kernel=Matching using kernel algorithm. 
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Table 4.- Distribution of supported firms by type of additionality and other firm 
characteristics 
  
  
Variable 
Number 
of firms 
Type of additionality  
(percentage of firms by row) 
FADD PSUB FSUB 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public support 
(yes/no): 
Only regional  3359 53.1 6.3 40.6 
Only national  3046 62.7 6.9 30.4 
Only EU 445 51.9 9.4 38.7 
Regional and national 1625 64.1 8.9 27.0 
Regional and EU 256 58.2 11.3 30.5 
National and EU 467 68.7 10.5 20.8 
All types 892 73.2 11.3 15.5 
Subsidy intensity: <25% 2527 77.7 0.8 21.5 
25% - 50% 2527 65.3 2.6 32.2 
50% - 75% 2514 57.8 6.8 35.5 
>75% 2522 40.7 21.1 38.3 
Size (number of 
employees): 
< 20  2317 38.7 10.4 51.0 
21–50  2240 54.3 8.9 36.8 
51-100  1616 63.1 8.8 28.1 
101-200  1309 69.7 6.6 23.7 
201-500  1356 74.0 5.0 20.9 
> 500  1252 83.2 3.9 12.9 
Age:  Start-up (<3 years old) 33 63.6 12.1 24.2 
Old firm (>20 years old) 5063 66.7 6.9 26.4 
Export intensity: 0% 4729 53.1 9.7 37.3 
> 0% - < 10% 2527 64.5 6.3 29.2 
10% - 50% 2233 69.1 6.2 24.6 
> 50% 592 67.9 4.9 27.2 
Ownership 
structure: 
Public capital 347 58.2 10.7 31.1 
Foreign capital  866 77.9 5.1 17.0 
Domestic group 3843 69.0 6.0 25.1 
Independent firm 5034 50.9 9.4 39.6 
Patenting (yes/no) 2610 2458 71.9 6.1 
Technological cooperation (yes/no) 3081 7099 60.7 7.6 
Human capital Low 3372 63.2 6.9 29.8 
Medium  3361 64.9 6.2 28.9 
High 3357 53.0 10.2 36.8 
Gross R&D 
intensity: 
< 1% 1694 58.6 7.4 33.9 
1% - 2.5% 1484 61.5 6.2 32.3 
2.5% - 5% 1475 65.6 6.0 28.4 
>5% 5437 59.2 8.8 32.0 
Type of R&D 
activities: 
Basic research  1420 65.1 7.5 27.4 
Applied research  6871 62.0 7.7 30.3 
Technological development  8069 62.0 7.5 30.5 
Obstacles to 
innovation (yes 
/no): 
Financial factors  5993 57.6 8.1 34.4 
Knowledge factors 2540 57.6 7.5 34.9 
Market factors 3797 58.7 7.6 33.7 
Sector (yes/no): P. trad. consumer goods 1427 59.2 6.4 34.3 
P. trad. intermediate goods 714 64.1 5.6 30.3 
Specialized suppliers 980 62.9 6.6 30.5 
Scale-intensive 1214 75.6 4.9 19.5 
Science-based 767 69.2 5.7 25.0 
High-tech services 2180 55.6 9.6 34.9 
Low-tech services/construction 2808 53.8 9.8 36.3 
Total sample 10,090 60.4 7.8 31.9 
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Table 5.- Determinants of individual treatment effects. 
 
 
Probability of 
full additionality  
Probability of 
positive ITE on 
net R&D intensity  
ITEs on 
net R&D intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
Public support:         
   - Only regional -0.139*** 0.017  -0.076*** 0.016  -0.095*** 0.024 
   - Only national  -0.077*** 0.017  -0.046*** 0.016  -0.074*** 0.025 
   - Only EU  -0.112*** 0.029  -0.098*** 0.027  -0.045 0.033 
   - Regional and EU  0.008 0.035  0.041 0.035  0.051* 0.031 
   - National and EU  0.039 0.029  -0.018 0.027  -0.015 0.047 
   - All types  0.140*** 0.024  0.066*** 0.022  0.113*** 0.038 
Subsidy intensity 0.107*** 0.028  -0.056** 0.024  0.082*** 0.032 
Subsidy intensity squared -0.042*** 0.005  0.006 0.004  -0.028*** 0.006 
Size (t-1) 0.097*** 0.016  -0.120*** 0.016  -0.157*** 0.019 
Size squared (t-1) -0.001 0.002  0.005*** 0.002  0.009*** 0.002 
Age 0.026** 0.010  0.025*** 0.009  -0.008 0.013 
Exporter (t-1) -0.005 0.012  -0.030** 0.012  -0.060*** 0.016 
Ownership structure:         
   - Public capital -0.059* 0.031  -0.008 0.030  0.070** 0.031 
   - Foreign capital 0.117*** 0.022  0.067*** 0.020  0.071*** 0.017 
   - Domestic group 0.050*** 0.012  -0.024** 0.012  0.007 0.017 
Patent applications (t-1) 0.041*** 0.009  -0.006 0.007  0.032*** 0.012 
Technological cooperation (t-1) -0.116*** 0.012  -0.120*** 0.011  -0.055*** 0.010 
Human capital (t-1) -0.047** 0.023  -0.036 0.022  0.007 0.027 
Gross R&D intensity (t-1):         
   - Between 1% and 2.5%  0.058*** 0.019  0.100*** 0.016  -0.025 0.019 
   - Between 2.5% and 5% 0.123*** 0.020  0.209*** 0.017  -0.029 0.018 
   - More than 5%  0.201*** 0.018  0.370*** 0.017  0.065*** 0.017 
Type of R&D activities (t-1):         
   - Basic research 0.014 0.016  0.034** 0.016  0.108*** 0.024 
   - Applied research -0.045*** 0.012  -0.064*** 0.011  -0.048*** 0.015 
   - Technological development  -0.057*** 0.013  -0.103*** 0.013  -0.088*** 0.016 
Obstacles to innovation (t-1):         
   - Financial factors -0.029*** 0.011  -0.005 0.010  -0.005 0.014 
   - Knowledge factors 0.006 0.012  0.001 0.012  0.003 0.014 
   - Market factors -0.016 0.011  0.026** 0.011  0.005 0.014 
Activity sector:         
   - P. trad. consumer goods 0.046** 0.019  0.009 0.018  0.034 0.024 
   - P. trad. intermediate goods 0.037 0.024  0.009 0.022  -0.002 0.027 
   - Specialized suppliers 0.041* 0.021  -0.003 0.020  -0.009 0.023 
   - Scale-intensive 0.113*** 0.020  0.040** 0.019  0.057** 0.027 
   - Science-based 0.083*** 0.023  0.066*** 0.022  0.002 0.025 
   - High-tech services 0.002 0.016  0.066*** 0.016  0.169*** 0.025 
Log likelihood -5,692.75  -5,644.56   
Observed probability 0.60  0.55   
Predicted probability 0.61  0.62   
Correct predictions 70.45  71.57   
Correct predictions: 1/0 75.42/62.79  75.39/65.34   
No. observations 10,090  10,090  10,090 
Notes: S.E: Robust standard errors. ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are 
calculated at sample means. All estimates include the constant and time dummies. Excluded variables: Independent 
firm; Low-tech services and construction sectors; Firms with R&D intensity lower than 1%; and Firms with regional 
and national support.
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Appendix A. Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Outcome variables: 
 
    Gross R&D intensity Total R&D expenditures over sales 
    Net R&D intensity Net R&D expenditures (total R&D expenditures net of public 
subsidies) over sales  
Firm characteristics: 
 
    Size  Number of employees (in logarithms).  
    Age Age of the firm (number of years since creation in logarithms). 
    Exporter  =1 if the firm exported during the period, 0 otherwise. 
    Ownership structure: 
 
       - Public capital =1 if the firm has public capital, 0 otherwise. 
       - Foreign capital =1 if the firm has foreign capital (at least 50%), 0 otherwise. 
       - Domestic group =1 if the firm belongs to a domestic group, 0 otherwise. 
    Patent applications Number of patents requested (in logarithms). 
    Technological cooperation =1 if the firm has established technological cooperation during the last 
three years with other partners, 0 otherwise. 
    Human capital  Number of workers with higher education over total number of 
employees (percentage) 
    Type of R&D expenditure:  
       - Basic research  =1 if the firm has positive expenditures on basic research, 0 otherwise. 
       - Applied research  =1 if the firm has positive expenditures on applied research, 0 
otherwise. 
       - Technological development  =1 if the firm has positive expenditures on technological 
development, 0 otherwise. 
    Obstacles to innovation:  
       - Financial factors  =1 if the lack of funds in the firm or group, lack of external financing 
or high innovation costs are considered as factors with high or 
medium importance in at least one of the questions used, 0 otherwise 
       - Knowledge factors =1 if the lack of qualified staff, information on technology and 
information about markets, and difficulties to in cooperating are 
considered as factors with high or medium importance in at least one 
of the questions used, 0 otherwise. 
       - Market factors =1 if the dominance of market by established firms, uncertain demand 
of innovative goods and services or lack of demand of innovations are 
considered as factors with high or medium importance in at least one 
of the questions used, 0 otherwise. 
    Activity sector:  =1 if the firm belongs to the following sector (0 otherwise):  
       - P. trad. consumer goods Producers of traditional consumer goods (Pavitt1) 
    - P. trad. intermediate goods Producers of traditional intermediate goods (Pavitt2) 
    - Specialized suppliers Producers specialized in intermediate goods and equipment (Pavitt3) 
    - Scale-intensive Assemblers and sectors with the advantage of scale (Pavitt4) 
    - Science-based Science-based sectors  
    - High-tech services High technology services sector 
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Appendix B. Matching procedure 
 
Table B.1: Probability of being supported. Probit model 
 
 dy/dx S.E 
Size (t-1) 0.057*** 0.007 
Size squared (t-1) -0.004*** 0.001 
Age -0.031*** 0.005 
Exporter (t-1) 0.029*** 0.006 
Ownership structure:   
   - Public capital 0.065*** 0.016 
   - Foreign capital -0.140*** 0.009 
   - Domestic group -0.001 0.006 
Patent applications (t-1) 0.051*** 0.004 
Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.215*** 0.005 
Human capital (t-1) 0.240*** 0.011 
Type of R&D activities (t-1):   
   - Basic research  -0.006 0.008 
   - Applied research  0.113*** 0.005 
   - Technological development  0.134*** 0.006 
Obstacles to innovation (t-1):   
   - Financial factors 0.026*** 0.005 
   - Knowledge factors 0.011* 0.006 
   - Market factors  0.008 0.006 
Activity sector:   
   - P. trad. consumer goods -0.041*** 0.009 
   - P. trad. intermediate goods 0.034*** 0.011 
   - Specialized suppliers 0.002 0.010 
   - Scale-intensive 0.013 0.010 
   - Science-based -0.082*** 0.010 
   - High-tech services 0.103*** 0.009 
Wald test   
    Sectorial dummies χ2 (6)  330.75***  
    Time dummies χ2 (6)  130.53***  
LR Chi2 (28) 6965  
Log of likelihood -17531  
Pseudo R2 0.166  
No. observations 34,569  
 
Notes: ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are calculated at the sample 
means. S.E. = Standard errors. The model includes the constant and time dummies. 
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Table B.2: Quality of the matching procedure: Comparing the average values for the 
variables before and after matching 
 
  Before Matching   After Matching 
Variable Treated Control p>|t|   Treated Control p>|t| 
Size (t-1) 4.301 4.288 0.473 
 
4.302 4.282 0.377 
Size squared (t-1) 21.215 20.934 0.116 
 
21.216 20.971 0.270 
Age  3.072 3.221 0.000 
 
3.081 3.073 0.378 
Exporter (t-1) 0.620 0.611 0.123 
 
0.629 0.635 0.358 
Ownership structure:        
   - Public capital 0.034 0.020 0.000 
 
0.034 0.038 0.133 
   - Foreign capital 0.084 0.151 0.000 
 
0.086 0.087 0.764 
   - Domestic group 0.379 0.315 0.000   0.381 0.384 0.622 
Patent applications (t-1) 0.350 0.155 0.000 
 
0.329 0.346 0.101 
Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.678 0.350 0.000 
 
0.673 0.665 0.188 
Human Capital (t-1) 0.418 0.272 0.000 
 
0.412 0.418 0.174 
Type of R&D activities (t-1):        
- Applied research 0.645 0.452 0.000 
 
0.655 0.652 0.723 
   - Basic research  0.132 0.077 0.000 
 
0.132 0.130 0.677 
   - Technological development 0.751 0.529 0.000   0.766 0.770 0.463 
Obstacles to innovation (t-1):        
   - Financial factors 0.569 0.496 0.000 
 
0.574 0.564 0.164 
   - Knowledge factors  0.258 0.213 0.000 
 
0.260 0.266 0.345 
   - Market factors 0.367 0.338 0.000   0.369 0.361 0.279 
Activity sector:        
   - P. trad. consumer goods 0.140 0.218 0.000  0.141 0.147 0.237 
   - P. trad. intermediate goods 0.069 0.075 0.077  0.071 0.073 0.623 
   - Specialized suppliers 0.095 0.120 0.000  0.097 0.091 0.111 
   - Scale-intensive 0.118 0.109 0.010  0.120 0.125 0.345 
   - Science-based 0.074 0.110 0.000  0.076 0.082 0.124 
   - High-tech services 0.228 0.087 0.000  0.216 0.218 0.720 
Year 2009 0.177 0.163 0.001 
 
0.176 0.172 0.373 
Year 2010 0.161 0.150 0.005 
 
0.162 0.157 0.356 
Year 2011 0.143 0.139 0.348 
 
0.144 0.143 0.794 
Year 2012 0.120 0.134 0.001 
 
0.121 0.126 0.295 
Year 2013 0.108 0.124 0.000 
 
0.109 0.109 0.928 
Year 2014 0.103 0.113 0.006   0.105 0.107 0.648 
Pseudo R2  0.166 
  
 0.001 
 LR Chi2  6965.18 
  
 36.42 
 p >  Chi2  0.000      0.132   
Mean Bias  16.4    1.3  
Notes: ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Results obtained using the nearest neighbor procedure 
with only 1 neighbor, common support and caliper (0.0015).  
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Figure B.1.- Distribution of propensity score 
 
Before Matching After Matching 
  
K-S test: 0.399*** K-S test: 0.211 
 
Notes: ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Results obtained using the nearest neighbor procedure 
with only 1 neighbor, common support and caliper (0.0015). K-S: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of distribution functions. 
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Table C.1.- Complementary estimates 
 
Probability of positive 
ITE on gross R&D 
expenditure  
Probability of positive 
ITE on 
gross R&D intensity  
Treatment effect on 
gross R&D intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
Public support:         
   - Only regional -0.127*** 0.015  -0.076*** 0.016  -0.128*** 0.026 
   - Only national  -0.063*** 0.015  -0.046*** 0.016  -0.117*** 0.025 
   - Only EU  -0.101*** 0.026  -0.098*** 0.027  -0.072* 0.039 
   - Regional and EU  0.012 0.032  0.041 0.035  0.106** 0.046 
   - National and EU  0.057** 0.027  -0.018 0.027  -0.001 0.049 
   - All types  0.142*** 0.023  0.066*** 0.022  0.323*** 0.050 
Subsidy intensity -0.093*** 0.026  -0.056** 0.024  -0.090** 0.037 
Subsidy intensity squared 0.007* 0.004  0.006 0.004  0.014** 0.007 
Size (t-1) 0.096*** 0.014  -0.120*** 0.016  -0.236*** 0.031 
Size squared (t-1) -0.002 0.001  0.005*** 0.002  0.014*** 0.003 
Age 0.027*** 0.009  0.025*** 0.009  -0.004 0.015 
Exporter (t-1) -0.005 0.011  -0.030** 0.012  -0.086*** 0.018 
Ownership structure:         
   - Public capital -0.052* 0.028  -0.008 0.030  0.171*** 0.056 
   - Foreign capital 0.106*** 0.021  0.067*** 0.020  0.090*** 0.022 
   - Domestic group 0.044*** 0.011  -0.024** 0.012  0.004 0.021 
Patent applications (t-1) 0.033*** 0.009  -0.006 0.007  0.051*** 0.014 
Technological cooperation (t-1) -0.110*** 0.011  -0.120*** 0.011  -0.053*** 0.015 
Human capital (t-1) -0.030 0.021  -0.036 0.022  0.101*** 0.037 
R&D intensity (t-1):         
   - Between 1% and 2.5%  0.057*** 0.017  0.100*** 0.016  -0.029 0.018 
   - Between 2.5%  and 5% 0.100*** 0.018  0.209*** 0.017  -0.036* 0.019 
   - More than 5%  0.183*** 0.017  0.370*** 0.017  0.095*** 0.019 
Type of R&D activities (t-1):         
   - Basic research -0.011 0.015  0.034** 0.016  0.178*** 0.031 
   - Applied research -0.035*** 0.011  -0.064*** 0.011  -0.053*** 0.020 
   - Technological development  -0.053*** 0.012  -0.103*** 0.013  -0.112*** 0.023 
Obstacles to innovation (t-1):         
   - Financial factors -0.031*** 0.010  -0.005 0.010  -0.007 0.018 
   - Knowledge factors 0.003 0.011  0.001 0.012  0.015 0.022 
   - Market factors -0.022** 0.010  0.026** 0.011  0.001 0.017 
Activity sector:         
   - P. trad. consumer goods 0.024 0.017  0.009 0.018  0.053** 0.022 
   - P. trad. intermediate goods 0.020 0.022  0.009 0.022  0.025 0.027 
   - Specialized suppliers 0.038* 0.019  -0.003 0.020  -0.001 0.023 
   - Scale-intensive 0.096*** 0.019  0.040** 0.019  0.075** 0.030 
   - Science-based 0.075*** 0.021  0.066*** 0.022  0.012 0.025 
   - High-tech services -0.003 0.014  0.066*** 0.016  0.290*** 0.035 
Log likelihood -5569.17  -5,212.86   
Observed probability 0.68  0.66   
Predicted probability 0.69  0.65   
Correct predictions 69.71  73.81   
Correct predictions: 1/0 75.42/62.79  81.14/60.35   
No. observations 10,090  10,090  10,090 
Notes: S.E: Robust standard errors. ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are 
calculated at sample means. All estimates include the constant and time dummies. Excluded variables: Independent 
firm; Low-tech services and construction sectors; Firms with R&D intensity lower than 1%; and Firms with regional 
and national support.  
